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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

APPLYING RESTORATIVE JUSTICE TO ONGOING INTIMATE
VIOLENCE: PROBLEMS AND POSSIBILITIES

C. QUINCE HOPKINS,* MARY P. KOSS,** AND KAREN J. BACHAR***

I. IDENTIFYING THE PROBLEM:
THE LIMITS OF EXISTING REMEDIES FOR DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
The prevalence of domestic violence is certainly well documented.1 While
Western historical accounts of domestic violence intervention efforts focus
primarily on events of the last few decades, women and men have in fact been
working to eradicate intimate abuse for over 2000 years.2 The first known tortlike remedy for domestic violence was enacted over two millennia ago, in 200
B.C.E.3 The first criminal prohibition against all domestic battering (other
* C. Quince Hopkins, Assistant Professor and RESTORE Legal Consultant, Washington and Lee
University School of Law, B.A. St. Johns College, J.D. University of Maryland, J.S.M. and J.S.D.
(ABD) Stanford Law School. Hopkins gratefully acknowledges the assistance of the Frances
Lewis Law Center, Washington and Lee University, and the able and cheerful research assistance
of Jill Lowell. All errors that remain are of course our own. Finally, our deepest respect and
appreciation go out to the editorial board of the St. Louis University Public Law Review,
particularly John M. Challis, for their exceptional work preparing this article for publication. The
RESTORE program is funded by a 1.5 million dollar grant from the National Center for Injury
Prevention and Control, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, R49/CCR921709.
** Mary P. Koss, Ph.D. Professor of Public Health and Principal Investigator of the RESTORE
Program, Mel and Enid Zuckerman College of Public Health, University of Arizona, Tucson,
Arizona.
*** Karen J. Bachar, M.A., MPH, Ph.D (ABD). Research Director for Violence Prevention
Studies and Co-Investigator of the RESTORE Program, Mel and Enid Zuckerman College of
Public Health, University of Arizona, Tucson, Arizona.
1. See infra notes 5–7 and accompanying text.
2. For a full discussion of this subject, see C. Quince Hopkins, Rescripting Relationships:
Towards a Nuanced Theory of Domestic Violence as Sex Discrimination, 9 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y &
L. 411, 419-20 (2002) (describing historical reform efforts over the past two millennia). For a
discussion of reform efforts of battered women’s advocates in the United States during the last
three decades of the 20th century, see LORETTA FREDRICK & KRISTINE C. LIZDAS, BATTERED
WOMEN’S JUST. PROJECT, THE ROLE OF RESTORATIVE JUSTICE IN THE BATTERED WOMEN’S
MOVEMENT 6, 11, 15 (Sept. 2003) (describing the battered women’s movement as focused
primarily on criminal justice reform along with the following issues: community education,
shelters and support groups, advocacy for protection orders, and to a lesser degree, victim
compensation, and restitution).
3. Hopkins, Rescripting Relationships, supra note 2, at 420.
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than in self-defense) was established in the Puritan’s Bodies of Liberties of
1641.4 But it is not until the latter part of the 20th century that one can observe
a concerted global effort to address the wide-spread prevalence of domestic
violence that was perhaps not present in these prior reform movements.5
However, although these more recent efforts may seem substantial, there is
only minimal evidence that these reforms have yielded low prevalence rates of
family violence in any significant way, at least in the United States.6 In 1993,
for example, almost forty percent of all reported violent assaults against
women in the United States resulted from family violence: intimate partners
perpetrated approximately twenty-nine percent of reported violent assaults
against women, and other relatives perpetrated an additional nine percent of
violent assaults against women.7
Further, existing legal responses to family violence provide incomplete
redress for survivors. For instance, as witnesses rather than parties in criminal
cases, victims’ control over prosecution is limited; in fact the traditional
criminal justice system, at the urging of battered women’s advocates,
affirmatively displaces battered women from the center of prosecutions in a
noble effort to take on the primary responsibility of confronting batterers about
their violence.8 Second, when prosecutions do take place, and domestic
violence defendants are actually convicted, the penalty “paid” by the defendant
rarely devolves to the victim’s benefit outside of criminal “stay-away” orders.9
The only other direct benefit to victims, when it is ordered, is restitution; this is
a remedy rarely sought by victims, particularly when family resources are

4.
5.
6.
7.

Id.
Id. at 422.
Id. at 423.
See DIANE CRAVEN, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SELECTED FINDINGS, FEMALE VICTIMS OF
VIOLENT CRIME 2 (1996) available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/fvvc.pdf. An
additional 40% of assaults on women appear to have been committed by an
“acquaintance/friend.” Id. This category might include perpetrators that were not clearly
identified as an intimate partner, but who would in fact fit into that category. Thus the figure for
incidents of domestic violence against women might well be much closer to 78% of assaults
against women. Id. Statistics for the same period indicate that in contrast to female assaults,
male victimizations more frequently involved strangers. Id. Male victims are about as likely to
be victimized by a stranger, at 49%, as by someone they know (51%). Id. More recent statistics
indicate that 20% of non-fatal violence against women is committed by their intimate partners
(including spouses, former spouses, boyfriends, and girlfriends). CALLIE MARIE RENNISON, U.S.
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE, 1993-2001, at 2001, at 1 (Feb. 2003) available
at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/ipv01.pdf. Concerning the controversy over prevalence
measures, see Hopkins, Rescripting Relationships, supra note 2, at 423.
8. FREDERICK & LIZDAS, supra note 2, at 28; Hopkins, Rescripting Relationships, supra
note 2, at 435.
9. Hopkins, Rescripting Relationships, supra note 2 at 436.
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limited.10 In addition, empirical research demonstrates that what most victims
really want, beyond stopping the violence itself, is not punishment in the form
of jail time or a fine, but an opportunity to speak about what has happened to
them and to receive an acknowledgement of wrongdoing and/or an apology
from the defendant.11 Third, existing remedies are problematic because they
often base relief on an essentialized conception of a victim of domestic
violence which can exclude many survivors from protection.12 One can
attempt to describe the prototypical domestic violence case, and these efforts
are laudable and not without value, but any such attempt is necessarily hamfisted when applied to real victims and real perpetrators; each victim presents
her own particular concerns and circumstances.13 Existing remedies such as
civil rights remedies and battered woman syndrome defenses often fail to
adequately accommodate these differences.14
10. Id.; FREDERICK & LIZDAS, supra note 2, at 11 (noting that victim compensation is rarely
sought by victims since family resources often barely meet existing needs).
11. Hopkins, Rescripting Relationships, supra note 2, at 436; see also FREDERICK &
LIZDAS, supra note 2, at 33-34 (noting that most women do not want the men who batter them to
be penalized and critiquing some battered women’s programs for insisting on an approach that
emphasizes separation from the abuser, thus merely replacing one view of what she should do –
that of the batterer, with another – that of the program); accord Donna Coker, Enhancing
Autonomy for Battered Women: Lessons from Navajo Peacemaking, 47 UCLA L. Rev. 1, 67 - 73
(discussing Navajo Peacemaking as a justice approach that avoids the problem of forcing women
to choose between competing loyalties and identities). See also Mary P. Koss, Blame, Shame,
and Community: Justice Responses to Violence Against Women, 55 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1332
(2000). This is discussed more at length in C. Quince Hopkins, Remembering and Forgetting:
The Role of Public Truth-Telling in Law, at 9 (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
12. On the variation among domestic violence victims, see MICHELE HARWAY, BATTERED
WOMEN: CHARACTERISTICS AND CAUSES; BATTERING AND FAMILY THERAPY: A FEMINIST
PERSPECTIVE, 29-31, 35-36 (M. Hansen & M. Harway eds., 1993) reprinted in CLARE DALTON
& ELIZABETH SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMEN AND THE LAW 96–97 (2001).
13. See Hopkins, Rescripting Relationships, supra note 2, at 424 (discussing variation
among victims). Concerning variation among perpetrators, see, e.g., DONALD DUTTON, THE
BATTERER 12-14, 22-38 (1995) (describing different kinds of batterers); HARWAY, supra note 12,
at 95–97 (describing victims of intimate violence); Martha Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered
Women: Redefining the Issue of Separation, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1, 24 (1991) (“‘Battered woman’
is not a simple term”); Elizabeth Schneider, Particularity and Generality: Challenges of Feminist
Theory and Practice in Work on Woman-Abuse, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 520, 529-31 (1992) (objecting
to the essentializing nature of the term “battered woman”).
14. Evidentiary rules that allow introduction of expert testimony on Battered Woman
Syndrome have proven particularly problematic in criminal defense cases involving battered
women who fight back: a woman who strikes back or demonstrates some financial independence
may not appear to fit the model helpless victim that Lenore Walker, who first developed the
theory of battered woman syndrome, portrayed. See, e.g., DALTON & SCHNEIDER, supra note 12,
at 743 (2001) (pointing out that battered woman syndrome contains the risk of creating a new
stereotype of a “real” battered woman as “dependant, passive, psychologically as well as
physically damaged by the abuse, and helpless . . . [which] in turn creates the risk that women
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Fourth, most legal remedies fail to account for the ongoing nature of both
the violence and, in some cases, the relationship itself. The failure to address
the ongoing nature of domestic violence is largely evident in procedural and
evidentiary rules. When physical acts of violence do occur, evidentiary rules,
which exclude prior bad acts, imply that each attack should be viewed as a
flare up, a loss of control, a discrete act of violence that can be treated in the
same regard as any other single criminal act.15 Legislatures have begun to
develop statutes aimed at behaviors that are part of an ongoing pattern,
typically in the form of harassment and stalking statutes,16 but these efforts
have not gone far enough because they normally become relevant only after
the relationship has ended. Moreover, these statutes do not address the regime
of “private tyranny” under which a victim has lived prior to separating from
her abuser, nor are they typically sensitive to the possible ongoing relationship
between the parties.17 This is not to say that we should dismantle feminist
reform efforts of the past few decades that have moved towards insuring that
criminal acts of violence against intimate partners are not brushed under the
rug as mere private squabbles. However, to the extent victims need legal
remedies to account for this reality of their lives, we should do our best to
insure that responses to intimate violence do so.
Fifth and finally, existing civil and criminal remedies tend to account for
physical and economic harm to victims, but almost entirely fail to account for
psychological harm from intimate violence despite the fact that the emotional
damage from intimate violence typically lasts long after physical injuries have
healed. In fact, victims report that the psychological abuse causes them the

who do not conform to the helpless stereotype may be unable to benefit from expert testimony
about battering”); see generally LENORE WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN (1979). Recent civil
rights remedies for domestic violence similarly rely upon this trope of the “real” or paradigmatic
battered woman, while simultaneously creating a large sub-set of battered women who fall
outside their boundaries, and therefore now look less victimized in contrast. See Hopkins,
Rescripting Relationships, supra note 2, at 418.
15. In practice, the situation for victims is actually often much worse than if they had been
the victim of a stranger assault. In cases of stranger assault, police often take into account past
documented assaults by a suspect in deciding whether to arrest the suspect. See FED. R. EVID.
404(a)(1). Generally, character evidence cannot be used to show action in conformity with the
stated characteristic. Id.
16. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 646.9 (1999 and Supp. 2003) (stalking and harassment);
720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12-7.3 (2000 and Supp. 2003) (stalking).
17. I borrow the term “private tyranny” from Jane Maslow Cohen. See Jane Maslow Cohen,
Regimes of Private Tyranny: What Do They Mean to Morality and for the Criminal Law? 57 U.
PITT. L. REV. 757, 762-67 (1996). For a cogent discussion of the importance of taking account of
the ongoing nature of the relationship and the potential for future violence, see FREDERICK &
LIZDAS, supra note 2, at 29, 34.
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most harm.18 The number of women who suffer from clinical depression as a
result of physical abuse is extremely high.19 Furthermore, studies have shown
that almost thirty percent of suicide attempts among females involve battered
women.20 Despite this fact, physical acts that violate bodily integrity alone
form the basis of typical criminal felony and misdemeanor charges.21 When a
punch or sexual assault also causes psychological damage, some tort actions
may incorporate a remedy for it, but this is of limited availability.22 Just as
legislatures should consider the ongoing, cumulative nature of abusive
conduct, non-physical or psychological harm should also shape the process of
defining legal remedies.

18. See generally DUTTON, supra note 13; Nathalie Des Rosiers et al., Legal Compensation
for Sexual Violence: Therapeutic Consequences and Consequences for the Judicial System, 4
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 433 (1998).
19. See Mary P. Koss et al., Depression and PTSD in Survivors of Male Violence: Research
and Training Initiatives to Facilitate Recovery, 27 PSYCHOL. WOMEN Q. 130, 134-135 (2003)
(reviewing rates of depression). See also discussion infra Section II(C).
20. See Evan Stark & Anne Flitcraft, Killing the Beast Within: Woman Battering and
Female Suicidality, 25 INT’L J. HEALTH SERV. 43, 50 (1995).
21. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-57.2 (2001 & Supp. 2003) (classifying assault and
battery against a family or household member as a Class One misdemeanor); VA. CODE ANN. §
18.2-67.2:1 (2001 & Supp. 2003) (classifying marital rape in Virginia as punishable by not less
than five years in a state correctional facility, although further providing for probation in lieu of
incarceration where the defendant obtains counseling). For general descriptions of battering
behavior, see generally WALKER, supra note 14.
22. See, e.g., Jennifer Wriggins, Domestic Violence Torts, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 121, 124 n.7
(2001) (citing Merle H. Weiner, Domestic Violence and the Per Se Standard of Outrage, 54 MD.
L. REV. 183, 189 n.16 (1995)). As William Prosser opines in his classic tome on the law of torts:
It does not lie within the power of any judicial system to remedy all human wrongs . . . .
Trivialities must be left to other means of settlement, and many wrongs which in
themselves are flagrant – ingratitude, avarice, broken faith, brutal words, and heartless
disregard of the feelings of others – are beyond any effective legal remedy, and any
practical administration of the law.
W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS § 4 (5th ed. 1984); but cf.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1965) (“one who by extreme . . . conduct intentionally
or recklessly causes severe emotional distress to another is subject to liability for such emotional
distress, and if bodily harm to the other results from it, for such bodily harm.”). See generally
SUSAN BROWNMILLER, AGAINST OUR WILL: MEN, WOMEN AND RAPE (1975); SUSAN ESTRICH,
REAL RAPE (1987). See, e.g., Mary Ann Dutton et al., Court-Involved Battered Women’s
Responses to Violence: The Role of Psychological, Physical, and Sexual Abuse, at 3 (1999)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author); C. Quince Hopkins, Domestic Violence as Torture:
Possibilities and Limits of the Law in Combating the Psychological Harm and Patterned Nature
of Domestic Violence (1998-99) (unpublished L.L.M. thesis, Stanford Law School) (on file with
author). Stalking is a now-classic example of “non-violent” and yet threatening behavior. See,
e.g., Devon W. Carbado, The Construction of O.J. Simpson as a Racial Victim, 32 HARV. C.R.C.L. L. REV. 49, 63-64 (1997) (describing the effect of non-actionable stalking behavior).
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In order to reduce permanently the prevalence of this problem and to
provide survivors with comprehensive remedies, advocates must continue to
press for novel legal reforms in the hope that the right combination of legal
interventions will someday be achieved that will finally reduce the prevalence
of this public health problem and at the same time meet the needs of individual
victims. One such possibility is applying restorative justice to family violence.
The possibilities and limits of such an approach are the focus of the remainder
of this article.23 Section II explains the concepts underlying and models
implementing restorative justice. Sections III and IV assess feminist theories
and particular critiques of the application of restorative justice to intimate
violence, identifying them as primarily empirical ones. Finally, Section V
discusses empirical evidence of successes in using restorative justice in
violence against women cases.
II. WHAT IS RESTORATIVE JUSTICE?
Restorative justice is a philosophy that places emphasis on repairing harm,
empowering a victim-driven process, and transforming the community’s role
in addressing crime. It approaches offender accountability through making
reparations and undergoing rehabilitation rather than by punishment.24 Recent
literature reveals numerous thoughtful considerations of the application of
restorative justice to crimes against women.25 Restorative justice models
23. Other scholars, many of whom are cited in this article, have addressed the potential
theoretical benefits and detriments of restorative justice for family violence cases. Some authors
advocate against using restorative justice in this venue, while others advocate for such an
approach. One scholar who takes the latter position is Linda Mills. See LINDA G. MILLS, INSULT
TO INJURY: RETHINKING OUR RESPONSES TO INTIMATE ABUSE 134-142 (2003). Mills’s work
might well reach the right result, but not necessarily for the right reasons. Her call for restorative
justice for intimate violence rests in part on claims of women’s culpability in the violence they
experience and women’s equal use of physical violence against their partners. The research on
which she rests her argument has been discredited on a number of bases, which unfortunately
undercuts the strength of her contribution to this field. See Walter DeKeseredy, Book Review,
Insult to Injury: Rethinking our Responses to Intimate Abuse, 44 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY
(forthcoming 2004) (on file with author).
24. For a more complete discussion of restorative justice, see Mary P. Koss, Karen J.
Bachar, & C. Quince Hopkins, An Innovative Application of Restorative Justice to the
Adjudication of Selected Sexual Offenses, in CRIME PREVENTION, NEW APPROACHES 321
(Helmut Kury & Joachim Obergfell-Fuchs eds. 2003).
25. See generally Gordon Bazemore & Twila Hugley Earle, Balance in the Response to
Family Violence: Challenging Restorative Principles, in RESTORATIVE JUSTICE AND FAMILY
VIOLENCE 153 (John Braithwaite & Heather Strang eds., 2002); John Braithwaite & Kathleen
Daly, Masculinities, Violence and Communitarian Control, in CRIME CONTROL AND WOMEN 151
(Susan L. Miller ed., 1998); Kathleen Daly, Sexual Assault and Restorative Justice, in
RESTORATIVE JUSTICE AND FAMILY VIOLENCE, supra, at 62; Laureen Snider, Feminism,
Punishment, and the Potential of Empowerment, in CRIMINOLOGY AT THE CROSSROADS 246
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include (a) civil proceedings, (b) victim-offender reparation through mediation,
and (c) community conference approaches.26
Civil justice for intimate violence is pursued only with responsible parties
with substantial financial assets, which limits its applicability as a prevention
tool.27 Furthermore, civil justice is an adversarial process that shares the
traumatizing features of retributive justice. It also often involves comparative
fault doctrine, a new way to promote victim blame that is not part of criminal
trials.28 On a more theoretical level, a tort action expresses a fundamentally
different notion than does a criminal action. That is, a tort claim is entirely
private, personal, and individual in nature and aims to adjust rights as between
private persons rather than vindicate larger public or community interests.29
With respect to the second major form of restorative justice, mediation’s
conceptual foundation is inappropriate for application to crimes against
women because it fails to acknowledge the structural inequalities between the
victim and offender and wrongly presumes that there is “voice parity” between
the parties such that they have the same “truth-telling capacity.”30 That is,
most feminists subscribe to the theory that a batterer uses violence as a tool to
maintain power and control over his victim and that the physical violence can
be understood as a method of maintaining and reinforcing patriarchal gender
roles in particular.31 Mediation theory, however, rests on the assumption of

(Kathleen Daly & Lisa Maher eds., 1998); Michael Cavadino & James Dignan, Reparation,
Retribution and Rights, 4 INT’L REV. VICTIMOLOGY 233 (1996); Coker, supra note 11; Barbara
Hudson, Restorative Justice: The Challenge of Sexual and Racial Violence, 25 J.L. & SOC’Y 237
(1998); Koss, supra note 11; Einat Peled et al., Choice and Empowerment for Battered Women
Who Stay: Towards a Constructivist Model, 45 SOC. WORK 9 (2000).
26. See Koss et al., supra note 24, at 325.
27. Hopkins, Rescripting Relationships, supra note 2, at 437.
28. Ellen M. Bublick, Citizen No-Duty Rules: Rape Victims and Comparative Fault, 99
COLUM. L. REV. 1413, 1414 (1999).
29. I do not mean to overstate or misstate the matter here; tort law does embody some public
values such as financial cost-sharing concepts.
30. See, e.g., FREDERICK & LIZDAS, supra note 2, at 26, 29, 38 (using the terms “voice
parity” and “truth-telling capacity”). Frederick and Lizdas also argue that restorative justice that
encompasses face-to-face meetings between victim and offender might encourage confusion over
responsibility for the violence and inadvertently suggest that the victim is somehow responsible
for the violence. Id. at 29. This result is evidenced in Linda Mills’s call for restorative justice
because it in part incorporates the idea that women are partly to blame for the violence. See
Mills, supra note 23. For a procedural critique of mediation, see Jennifer Brown, The Use of
Mediation to Resolve Criminal Cases: A Procedural Critique, 43 EMORY L.J. 1247, 1273-79
(1994); Evelyn Zellerer, Community-Based Justice and Violence Against Women: Issues of
Gender and Race, 20 INT’L J. COMP. & APPLIED CRIM. JUST. 233, 236 (1996).
31. See ANN JONES, NEXT TIME SHE’LL BE DEAD: BATTERING & HOW TO STOP IT 94
(1994) (describing that women are beaten when they attempt to resist control or when they refuse
to comply with a batterer’s demands or expectations); accord FREDERICK & LIZDAS, supra note
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equal or near-equal bargaining power between the parties.32 The underlying
power dynamic in domestic violence cases thus makes it inappropriate for
mediation.
By contrast, many experts believe community conferencing comes the
closest to achieving restorative justice ideals, addressing the power disparities
often present in crimes of violence against women, and avoiding the trauma
and other problems of traditional civil justice.33 Community conferencing is a
coming together of identified family and other supporters for the victim and
offender in a professionally facilitated meeting to address the wrong done and
the harm that resulted from that wrong – to all parties and their relationships
with others – and to identify what the offender is going to do to make right the
wrong.34 Proper and complete preparation is key to a successful outcome of
community conferencing, and this is even truer in the case of conferencing
applied to violence against women, where underlying belief systems need to be
challenged.
In the following Section, we outline key feminist concepts relevant to a
restorative justice response to violence against women. In Section IV, we will
then address the central concerns expressed by feminists about such an
approach.
III. FEMINIST THEORY AND CONCERNS ABOUT APPLYING RESTORATIVE
JUSTICE TO VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN

2, at 11, 26, 27; see also Evan Stark, Re-Presenting Women Battering: From Battered Woman
Syndrome to Coercive Control, 58 ALB. L. REV. 973, 991-92 (1995) (discussing child and marital
abuse throughout history, and the patriarchal structure that accompanies it). But cf. Deborah M.
Hanrahan, Gender and Spousal Violence: A Test of Social Control and Resource Theories, at 9096 (1996) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Louisiana State University) (on file with author)
(arguing that power/dominance theory alone does not explain domestic violence, but rather, the
combination of power/dominance and social control theory provide a better and more complete
account of intimate abuse). As to the ostensible willing acquiescence to this patriarchal structure,
some feminist scholars question whether this kind of a choice reflects a true exercise of free will.
See, e.g., Kathryn Abrams, Sex Wars Redux: Agency and Coercion in Feminist Legal Theory, 95
COLUM. L. REV. 304, 329-30 (1995) (stating that feminist women often question whether their
own willing assimilation to the patriarchal structure makes their own oppression more or less
likely).
32. Developments in the Law: Legal Responses to Domestic Violence, 106 HARV. L. REV.
1498, 1602-03 (1993); accord FREDERICK & LIZDAS, supra note 2, at 25, 26, 29.
33. Cavadino & Dignan, supra note 25, at 253.
34. Thomas J. Scheff, Community Conferences: Shame and Anger in Therapeutic Justice, 67
REV. JUR. U.P.R. 97, 98 (1998). For a critique of the role of community in restorative justice for
domestic violence, see FREDERICK & LIZDAS, supra note 2, at 25, 27, 29, 32 (noting that the
relevant community in fact may not understand the dynamics of domestic violence, and might
even engage in victim-blaming behavior and collusion with the offender).
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Feminist theory comprises different, but overlapping, philosophical and
political stances. Although there are several ways one might separate these
strands, scholars often divide them into three categories: liberal, cultural, and
radical feminism.35 Liberal feminists, also referred to as “sameness” or “rule
equality” feminists, argue that formal equal treatment of men and women will
result in formal and functional equality between the sexes.36 “‘Sameness
feminists’ focus on the similarities between individual men and individual
women [leads] them to advocate ‘gender-neutral’ categories that do not rely on
gender stereotypes to differentiate between men and women.”37 In the eyes of
liberal feminists, the goals of law reform are laws and practices that respond to
violence against women in the home in the same way that those laws and
practices respond to stranger violence against men.
Cultural feminists, also referred to as “substantive equality” or
“difference” feminists, disagree that alteration of formal rules will result in
actual equality for women; equal treatment, they argue, disadvantages women
because the baselines favor men.38 Cultural feminists claim that traditional
religious, economic, political, and judicial institutions are both masculinist by
nature and masculinist in practice.39 For instance, these institutions are
masculinist in nature in that they are structured hierarchically rather than on a
collaborative model.40 For some feminists, such as Catharine MacKinnon,
who is often referred to as a “dominance” feminist, these structural
frameworks undergird as well as create men’s dominance over women.41 For
cultural feminists relying on Carol Gilligan’s work on women’s ethic of care,
collaboration and interpersonal relationships are particularly valued by women;

35. Barbara Ann White, Feminist Foundations for the Law of Business: One Law and
Economics Scholar’s Survey and (Re)View, 10 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 39, 44 (1999); cf. Patricia
Cain, The Future of Feminist Legal Theory, 11 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 367 (1997).
36. Maxine Eichner, On Postmodern Legal Theory, 36 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 32
(2001).
37. Herma Hill Kay, Equality and Difference: The Case of Pregnancy, 1 BERKELEY
WOMEN’S L.J. 1, 2 (1985); but see Sylvia A. Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 U.
PA. L. REV. 955, 955 (1984); Joan Williams, Deconstructing Gender, 87 MICH. L. REV. 797, 837
(1989).
38. Martha M. Ertman, Commercializing Marriage: A Proposal for Valuing Women’s Work
Through Premarital Security Agreements, 77 TEX. L. REV. 17, 27 (1998); Martha L. Fineman,
Implementing Equality: Ideology, Contradiction and Social Change: A Study of Rhetoric and
Results in the Regulation of the Consequences of Divorce, 1983 WIS. L. REV. 789, 811-12 (1983).
39. White, supra note 35, at 45.
40. Id. at 46.
41. CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 161-64
(1989) (claiming that her dominance theory is feminism, as opposed to one form or strand of
feminist theory); Ertman, supra note 38, at 93 n.314.
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whereas hierarchy is particularly embraced by men.42 Most (but not all)
cultural feminists today, however, claim not that women are in fact different
from men but that certain traits and values are perceived as “feminine” or
“female” or as “masculine” or “male” and that “male/masculine” traits are
embraced by legal and other institutions, while “female/feminine” traits are
devalued, marginalized, or even excluded by those institutions.43 In this sense,
for cultural feminists these institutions are masculinist in practice to the extent
that the rules under which they function exclude women’s unique voice and
lived experience; Robin West argues, for instance, that ostensibly neutral legal
evidentiary rules do not accommodate women’s particular narrative method,
thus yielding a crabbed account of any given woman’s experience.44 From a
cultural feminist perspective, then, recognition of women’s experiences and
contributions promotes equality.45
To the extent that women’s experiences of intimate violence are thus only
partially considered by a theoretically objectively neutral legal system, this
formal system often fails in providing any redress, much less a feminist
response.46 The failure of the system, in turn, may bolster the notion that
physical intimate violence against women is not a serious crime. A victimcentered restorative justice response that not only incorporates a survivor’s full
experience, but also holds an offender accountable to her and their relevant
community may yield the opposite outcome. In addition, insofar as cultural
feminism insists on the importance of human interconnectedness and
relationships, a justice system response would be feminist if it emphasizes the
damage that sexual or physical violence causes to relationships rather than only
recognizing the wrong done to the abstract state. Restorative justice takes
exactly this approach.
Contemporary radical feminist scholars, also referred to as “postmodern”
feminists, seek to eradicate inequality by undermining the existing binary
construct of male and female that have the effect of subordinating women to
men.47 Postmodern feminists thus advocate a complete restructuring of what
society understands as available gender roles.48 To the extent that intimate
violence towards women arises out of and relies upon polarized gendered roles
of maleness and femaleness, breaking down those constructs – the argument

42. CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE 163-64 (1982); Robin West, Jurisprudence
and Gender, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 50 (1988).
43. West, supra note 42, at 13.
44. Id. at 18.
45. Ertman, supra note 38, at 27; West, supra note 42, at 2-3.
46. Cain, supra note 35, at 367.
47. See generally Eichner, supra note 36.
48. Ertman, supra note 38, at 27.
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goes – may result in reductions of men’s physical assaults on women.49 In a
more general sense, however, restorative justice maps onto the postmodern
drive to break down categories. That is, by providing for a particularized
response to a crime of intimate violence, restorative justice insists that
survivors and responsible parties be viewed as something other than
predetermined caricatures of victim and offender.
As demonstrated by the foregoing discussion, feminism embraces multiple
perspectives and theories, such that the appropriate term is not the singular but
the plural: “feminisms.”50 Despite these various strands, a few precepts tend to
thread through them. First, each theory – with the exception of a narrow strand
of “difference feminism” that holds fast to pure biological determinism –
incorporates the understanding that gender is socially, historically, and
culturally constructed.51 Thus, gendered harm such as physical or sexual
violence against women is similarly socially, historically, and culturally
constructed. Second, social life and institutions are inextricable from gender
and gender relations.52 That is, not only do gendered social systems support
rape and domestic violence, so also do legal institutions’ failure to implement
effective remedies create and support that belief system.53 Third, social and
institutional structures are grounded on notions of men’s superiority over
women; in this vein, violence against women often (although not always)
represents the perpetrator’s belief about male dominance and female
subordination.54
Fourth, descriptions of and responses to social and legal constructs,
institutions, and practices must be grounded in women’s lived experiences.55
Thus, a feminist response to intimate violence against women must take
account of, and where possible, map onto survivors’ expressed preferences for

49. Eichner, supra note 36, at 76.
50. See Kathleen Daly & Meda Chesney-Lind, Feminism and Criminology, 5 JUST. Q. 497,
501-02 (1988); Susan Ayers, Incest in a Thousand Acres: Cheap Trick or Feminist Re-vision, 11
TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 131, 134-35 (2001).
51. Daly & Chesney-Lind, supra note 50, at 501.
52. Id. at 504.
53. Braithwaite & Daly, supra note 25, at 166-67; cf. FREDERICK & LIZDAS, supra note 2, at
34 (noting that the criminal justice system’s message that violence is intolerable is not overt in
most domestic violence cases, and even less so with respect to non-criminal but otherwise
controlling or intimidating behavior on the part of the batterer).
54. Daly & Chesney-Lind, supra note 50, at 499-500; Braithwaite & Daly, supra note 25, at
172-73; accord FREDERICK & LIZDAS, supra note 2, at 23-24.
55. Phyllis Goldfarb, A Theory-Practice Spiral: The Ethics of Feminism and Clinical
Education, 75 MINN. L. REV. 1599, 1630 (1991); Julie Stubbs, Domestic Violence and Women’s
Safety, in RESTORATIVE JUSTICE AND FAMILY VIOLENCE, supra note 25, at 47-48.
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redress.56 Further, however, most feminist theorists understand that women’s
lived experiences are not monolithic and universal, but culturally diverse,
highly contextual, and socially constructed.57 This insight triggers two
additional considerations. First, a feminist response to the experience of
intimate violence accommodates this variety by providing multiple options for
survivors, rather than one single cookie-cutter response. Second, however, this
“positionality” – that is, that any individual woman’s experience is always and
already contingent and constructed – suggests that although experience
remains an important and a “useful . . . basis for knowledge, [it must be]
coupled with the insight that the knowledge thus obtained is limited by
context.”58 For purposes of constructing a feminist response to intimate
violence against women, this means that an individual victim’s preference may
diverge from what, in the abstract, might be thought of as a “true” feminist
response, one which accounts for the larger systemic and institutional history
and practice of male physical dominance over women.59 Whether a response
to intimate violence might nonetheless be able to address both the individual
preferences of women and the larger systemic issues is no small matter, but
this is an unavoidable tension once we insist that women’s voices and
preferences matter.
IV. PARTICULAR FEMINIST CONCERNS ABOUT RESTORATIVE JUSTICE
RESPONSES TO VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN
Although restorative justice is now used widely and with some success
with juveniles, including juvenile sex offenders,60 experience with restorative

56. Cain, supra note 35, at 367; accord FREDERICK & LIZDAS, supra note 2, at 30, 33; but
cf. id. at 33 (arguing that battered women’s autonomy and choice to enter a restorative justice
program are not straightforward since fear of reprisal should she not participate may drive her to
“choose” to participate).
57. Nan Seuffert, Lawyering and Domestic Violence: Feminist Integration of Experiences,
Theories and Practice, in WOMEN, MALE VIOLENCE AND THE LAW 80 (Julie Stubbs ed., 1994).
58. Id. at 81.
59. Stubbs, supra note 55, at 60. For a discussion of the need to address the larger systemic
issues of gender, race, and cultural oppression at work in domestic violence, see FREDERICK &
LIZDAS, supra note 2, at 23-24, 34, 37-38. In some contexts, a victim’s expressed preference
may not only be mediated and formed through cultural influence, but also may be compromised
or constrained by immediate circumstances. Stubbs, supra note 55, at 44. For instance, a victim
of domestic violence may feel her choices are limited because of the potential future violence
from her abuser; in addition, if she has children with her abuser, her connection to those children
may further limit her full atomistic agency. Id. Accord FREDERICK & LIZDAS, supra note 2, at
33.
60. FREDERICK & LIZDAS, supra note 2, at 6; see generally Mary Koss, Karen Bachar, & C.
Quince Hopkins, Disposition and Treatment of Juvenile Sex Offenders from the Perspective of
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justice in response to violence against adult women is limited.61 As when
moving into any new area of research where lives may be at stake, it is
important to maintain a balance between the hope of success and prudence in
applying restorative justice to new areas. One must at all times be mindful of
the potential risk of harm to participants.62 Some feminist scholars have raised
important questions about the wisdom of using of restorative justice in
response to gendered violence. The majority of these concerns center on
whether restorative justice is an effective and safe response to violence against
women.63 Whether it is in fact safe or effective is, of course, an empirical
question.64 In her careful study of Navajo Peacemaker courts’ handling of
domestic violence cases, Donna Coker identifies the coerced attendance of
battered women coupled with the lack of safety screening as problematic
aspects of that program. After arguing that a peacemaking program could be
modified to correct these problems, Coker then rightly notes that with such a
modified program we may still ultimately find that the potential benefits of
restorative justice exist only in theory, but not in practice.65 The same is true
for the potential detriments of restorative justice for intimate violence: whether
the detriments will be borne out in practice must be evaluated empirically,
Restorative Justice, in HANDBOOK ON THE TREATMENT OF JUVENILE SEXUAL OFFENDERS
(Howard Barbaree ed. (publication forthcoming 2004)); Koss et al., supra note 24, at 322-29.
61. Compare the work of Donna Coker discussing Navajo Peacemaking for cases of family
violence in Coker, supra note 11, at 1. Coker’s evaluation of the Navajo Peacemaker courts does
not address whether or not these programs are effective in reducing battering. She thus urges
caution in moving forward until that empirical evidence has been established.
62. See John Braithwaite & Heather Strang, Restorative Justice and Family Violence, in
RESTORATIVE JUSTICE AND FAMILY VIOLENCE, supra note 25, at 1; cf. FREDERICK & LIZDAS,
supra note 2, at 40 (arguing that restorative justice for domestic violence cases should, at a
minimum, “do no harm” to victims).
63. See, e.g., Hudson, supra note 25, at 242; Stubbs, supra note 55, at 56-58; Coker, supra
note 11, at 114-15 (categorizing feminist concerns about informal adjudication for battered
women into four types: “the coercion problem, the cheap-justice problem, the normative problem,
and the communitarian/social-change problem”); see generally FREDERICK & LIZDAS, supra note
2.
64. Braithwate & Strang, supra note 62, at 1-2; cf. FREDERICK & LIZDAS, supra note 2, at 32
(inaccurately noting that because of flaws in restorative justice practice, the utility of restorative
justice has not yet been tested). Others who have studied restorative justice in indigenous
contexts similarly question whether restorative justice will work in all cultural contexts. See
Coker, supra note 11, at 107-111. Further, whether restorative justice will undercut or bolster
class, race, gender, and other oppressions also must be carefully watched. Stubbs, supra note 55,
at 48, 56.
65. Coker, supra note 11, at 77-80, 103-07, 111 (discussing the problem of coerced
participation and absence of safety screening, advocating for corrections of these problems, and
pointing out that the benefits may not be realized in practice). Peacemaking and sentencing
circles are two justice interventions employed by First Nations in the United States and Canada.
These approaches are versions of restorative justice. Id. at 3-4.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

302

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 23:289

something Coker does not purport to undertake. Cognizant of Coker’s caution,
however, in undertaking such a project, it is critical that restorative justice’s
foray into the new territory of violence against women takes these concerns
seriously. Such a foray must be guided by these caveats in choosing those
types of cases that pose the lowest potential risks to participants and the format
for responding to them.
In developing our own research on restorative justice for sex offenses
between acquaintances, funded by a $1.5 million dollar grant from the Centers
for Disease Control, we placed these concerns front and center. In developing
our pilot research demonstration project, entitled RESTORE, we specifically
chose to focus on a very narrow class of cases which posed the least risk of
harm to participants and the highest possible success rate. We have explained
the structure of this program and its theoretical grounding at length
elsewhere.66 In brief, we specifically chose to address sexual assaults between
acquaintances, rather than cases of physical violence between intimates. We
chose to do so precisely because many of the concerns about restorative justice
for violence against women, discussed at length below, are less applicable to
acquaintance sexual assault. We discuss these distinctions at length in another
article but note here just one illustrative distinction.67 Two of the feminist
concerns, discussed below, are that restorative justice will give an offender an
opportunity to engage in further violence and to psychologically abuse and
manipulate the survivor. In the narrow class of cases eligible for RESTORE –
most notably, only cases where the offense was not part of an ongoing pattern
of ongoing domestic violence – there is a reduced likelihood of deep
emotional, economic, and psychological enmeshment between the parties.
Where the parties’ interaction with each other is thus less intertwined, the
opportunity for the offender to engage in further physical violence or
psychological control of the survivor is significantly reduced.68 It was our
conclusion, therefore, that in moving forward with an as yet untested
application of restorative justice – that is, its application to gendered violence
generally — sexual assault between acquaintances was a “safer” test venue
than was ongoing physical violence between intimates.69

66. See Koss, supra note 11; Koss et al., supra note 24; Mary P. Koss, Karen J. Bachar & C.
Quince Hopkins, Restorative Justive for Sexual Violence: Repairing Victims, Building
Community, and Holding Offenders Accountable, 989 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. SCI. 384 (2003).
67. See C. Quince Hopkins, Mary P. Koss & Karen J. Bachar, Incorporating Feminist
Theory Into a Restorative Justice Response to Sex Offenses, 10 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN
(forthcoming 2004) (on file with author).
68. Id.
69. Id. For a careful presentation of the argument that restorative justice will not necessarily
account for the possibility of future violence in cases of domestic violence and urging that
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Joan Pennel and Gale Burford’s work, discussed in Section V, by contrast,
applies restorative justice to cases of family violence. Similarly, however,
their approach also takes seriously the feminist concerns about using
restorative justice for violence against women and proceeds cautiously in
implementing such a program for domestic violence. Pennel and Burford’s
research is yielding preliminary evidence of being more effective than
traditional justice for intimate violence.
The specific feminist concerns raised about restorative justice in
connection with family violence are the following. First, and primarily, if one
chooses to address cases of intimate violence where the violence has occurred
on more than one occasion already, the face-to-face concept of community
conferencing simply creates an opportunity for further acts of violence against
the victim.70 Second, even if the violence has occurred just one time, the faceto-face approach may either intentionally or unintentionally pressure the victim
Third, the
into returning to a potentially dangerous relationship.71
psychological impact on victims from ongoing domestic violence may
negatively affect her ability to present and protect her interests and wishes
during the course of the community conference.72 Fourth, the power and
control dynamics in many domestic violence cases mean that the process of
conferencing will yield poor results for victims unable to hold their own in the
face-to-face meeting.73 In addition, not only might fear constrain a victim’s
full agency, her connection to her children may compromise her otherwise
more free choice, as might economic and other enmeshment between the
victim and perpetrator.74 Fifth, to the extent that restorative justice relies on a
component of therapeutic intervention with perpetrators, there is only moderate
evidence that batterer’s treatment is at all effective: this evidence can be found
in very high quality programs and only where an offender actually completes
the program – a mere 10% of all program participants. Assessment of these
programs reveals that treated and non-treated abusers were not significantly
different in their future rates of re-offending nor were there differences in the
frequency of severe violence or threats of violence.75 If such treatment is only

domestic violence cases be screened out of restorative justice programs unless the program is
carefully structured, see FREDERICK & LIZDAS, supra note 2, at 26, 29, 30.
70. Stubbs, supra note 55, at 57.
71. Id. at 59-60.
72. Id. at 56.
73. Id. at 57; FREDERICK & LIZDAS, supra note 2, at 11, 26, 27.
74. Stubbs, supra note 5 at 44.
75. Daly, supra note 25, at 68-69; Adele Harrell, The Impact of Court-Ordered Treatment
for Domestic Violence Offenders, in LEGAL INTERVENTIONS IN FAMILY VIOLENCE: RESEARCH
FINDINGS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS, NCJ171666, at 73-74 (A.B.A. & U.S. Dep’t of Just. eds.
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moderately effective, the argument goes, why should we embrace an approach
to intimate violence that relies upon what is only a moderately effective
intervention? Sixth, to the extent apology might be important to restorative
justice concepts, a debatable question,76 the use of apology in cases of
domestic violence is often coercive rather than healing.77 An approach to
intimate violence that facilitates or encourages apology as an element of
restitution (in the colloquial, rather than legal sense of that term) may be
ineffective or harmful at worst. Seventh and finally, a restorative justice
response to intimate violence against women violates the central tenet of
liberal feminism that crimes of interpersonal violence against women receive
the same treatment as crimes of interpersonal violence against men.78 That is,
if incarceration and fines are the norm for male on male violence, then taking
incarceration and fines off the table constitutes justice “lite” for female victims
of male violence.79
These concerns have merit and thus cannot and should not be ignored.
However, a restorative justice response that is designed with feminist concepts
in mind, and that responds to those concerns to the extent possible, is worth
considering if early evaluations of its acceptability to participants, safety, and
effectiveness in reducing repeat offending are reproducible. The following
section describes the preliminary evidence.
V. EVIDENCE THAT RESTORATIVE JUSTICE IS SUCCEEDING WHERE
TRADITIONAL PRO-PROSECUTION APPROACHES HAVE NOT
2000). On the extent to which batterer’s programs are effective, see also R. EMERSON DOBASH
69-88, 107-145 (2000).
76. See, e.g., Coker, supra note 11, at 15. Researchers have studied the occurrence of
apologies in community conferences and other restorative justice responses and have compared
the outcomes of those cases with those where apology does not take place. Whether or not
apology in fact is an inherent component of a restorative justice response, however, is as yet
undertheorized in the literature. For one analysis on the impact of the apology in the criminal
justice system, see Carrie Petrucci, Apology in the Criminal Justice Setting: Evidence for
Including Apology as an Additional Component in the Legal System, 20 BEHAV. SCI. L. 337
(2002).
77. Stubbs, supra note 55, at 58-60. Donna Coker describes this particular problem of
overvaluing apologies in the context of battering. See Coker, supra note 11, at 85-88. The same
argument can be made with respect to the often concurrently discussed phenomenon of
forgiveness. See, e.g., FREDERICK & LIZDAS, supra note 2, at 39.
78. See supra notes 35-37 and accompanying text.
79. If, however, violence between intimates causes a unique harm, it might thus warrant a
particularized remedy that addresses that harm. In this sense, then, restorative justice would not
be treating similar crimes differently, but treating different crimes differently. A victim-centered
restorative justice response that yields reduced trauma to victims than traditional criminal justice,
responds to victims’ express preferences, and fashions redress in accordance with those
preferences could thus be consistent with liberal feminism.
ET AL., CHANGING VIOLENT MEN
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Given the foregoing criticisms and concerns about applying restorative
justice to adult-to-adult family violence, and particularly the concern that
victimized women may be pressured into forgiving and reconciling with their
violent partners, it is not surprising that researchers have shied away from
testing those concerns.80 As a result, there is little empirical evidence either
supporting or rebutting them. In addition to Donna Coker’s study of Navajo
Peacemaking discussed above, Joan Pennell and Gale Burford’s innovative
work in Canada and Pennell’s continuing work in the United States provides a
notable exception to this dearth of hard data on using restorative justice
methods for adult domestic violence.81
The discussion below focuses on Pennell and her colleagues’ work for a
number of reasons. First, Pennell and her colleagues’ work has not yet been
discussed thoroughly in the legal literature. Second and more substantively,
Pennell’s empirical research provides data on non-indigenous as well as
indigenous groups’ use of restorative justice that adds to, and complements,
Coker’s earlier study that focused exclusively on restorative justice within an
indigenous justice system. Third, the programs Pennell and her colleagues
describe, and thus their scholarship itself, benefit from the fact that the
programs were designed as research-based programs from the outset. Several
inter-related benefits arise from this inter-linking of program development and
research. For instance, Pennell and her colleagues were able to establish
comparison groups so that the effectiveness of their programs could (and can)
be carefully measured and evaluated. In addition, Pennell and her colleagues’
scholarship describes programs and program development from the outset of
those programs onward thus providing us with a ground up view of the
theoretical and practical undergirding of their programs followed by data on
their implementation and effectiveness. Finally, Pennell and her colleagues
intentionally and methodically consulted with domestic violence advocates in
the development of their research programs. In so doing, they attempted to
incorporate program-design elements that address some of the feminist

80. See Joan Pennell & Gale Burford, Feminist Praxis: Making Family Group Conferencing
Work, in RESTORATIVE JUSTICE AND FAMILY VIOLENCE, supra note 25, at 108-09 [hereinafter
Feminist Praxis] (noting that feminists approach with caution new approaches to family violence
that involve bringing perpetrators and victims together).
81. See generally id. Notably, however, Pennell and Burford’s innovative use of restorative
justice for cases of adult domestic violence came about inadvertently rather than by design. The
initial Canadian project aimed solely at cases of child abuse, neglect, and “youth
unmanageability,” but adult domestic violence soon became an equal focus of research, as
described below. Id. at 110 (describing how the initial focus of the Family Group Decision
Making Project was on child abuse, neglect, and delinquency, but that evidence of adult domestic
violence quickly emerged as a prevalent co-occurring phenomenon in the families referred to the
Project). Coker’s work is discussed in Part IV, supra.
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concerns about restorative justice that Coker and others so eloquently identify.
Their work thus represents the next stage in the development of a feministdefined restorative justice response to violence against women.
A.

Canadian Family Group Decision Making Project

In the early-1990s Pennell and Burford developed and implemented the
Family Group Decision Making Project in Canada (“FGDMP” or the
“Canadian Project”),82 a quasi-experimental program that employed the form
of restorative justice known as family group conferencing (“FGC”) initially
directed at cases of child abuse, neglect, and dependency.83 In the early stages
of the Project, however, it quickly became apparent that adult domestic
violence was a prevalent co-occurring event in the cases referred to the Project,
occurring in twenty-one of the thirty-two families referred.84 Pennell and
Burford embraced this development and incorporated into the FGDMP the
adult family violence they uncovered.85 They ultimately concluded that failure
to address the co-occurrence of child and spouse abuse shortchanged

82. Joan Pennell & Marie Weil, Initiating Conferencing: Community Practice Issues, in
FAMILY GROUP CONFERENCING: NEW DIRECTIONS IN COMMUNITY-CENTERED CHILD AND
FAMILY PRACTICE 253, 255-57 (Gale Burford & Joe Hudson eds., 2000) [hereinafter Initiating
Conferencing] (noting the early 1990s as the beginnings of the Family Group Decision Making
Project, and the dearth of empirical data on the effectiveness of conferencing at that point in
time). “The term ‘family group decision making’ was coined to emphasize that the family group,
made up of the immediate family and its relatives, friends, and other close supports, would decide
what steps needed to be taken to stop the maltreatment.” Joan Pennell & Gale Burford, Family
Group Decision Making: Protection Children and Women, 79 CHILD WELFARE 131, 137 (2000)
[hereinafter Family Group Decision Making].
83. Feminist Praxis, supra note 80, at 118.
84. Id. at 110; see also Family Group Decision Making, supra note 82, at 148. This finding
mirrors others’ research into the co-occurrence of adult domestic violence and child abuse.
Feminist Praxis, supra note 80, at 114 (citing Jeffrey Edleson, The Overlap Between Child
Maltreatment and Woman Battering, 5 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 134 (1999); PETER JAFFE,
DAVID WOLFE, & SUSAN WILSON, CHILDREN OF BATTERED WOMEN (1990); MURRAY STRAUS
& RICHARD GELLES, PHYSICAL VIOLENCE IN AMERICAN FAMILIES: RISK FACTORS AND
ADAPTATIONS TO VIOLENCE IN 8,145 FAMILIES (1990); Susan Ross, Risk of Physical Abuse to
Children of Spouse-Abusing Parents, 20 CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT 589 (1996)).
85. See Family Group Decision Making, supra note 82, at 137 (“From the outset, child
welfare services, women’s groups, police, parole officers, youth advocates, and others developed
a consensual statement of philosophy that stressed that everyone within a family should be safe
from abuse, no one in a family was safe if others were being victimized.”). Pennell and Burford
have elaborated on the importance of addressing child abuse and adult abuse jointly rather than as
discrete phenomena in this same article. Id. at 133-36.
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families.86 Pennell and Burford’s holistic intervention yielded marked
reductions in both child and spouse abuse.87
The Canadian Project conducted family group conferences with thirty-two
families over the course of a one year implementation period, coupled with a
one to two-year follow-up period.88 The Project requested that the most
difficult cases be referred to the FGDMP.89 Pennell and Burford also
established a comparison group, consisting of another set of families who did
not go through FGCs.90 The families were distributed roughly evenly between
three different implementation locales.91
Upon referral to the Canadian Project, family members engaged in
extensive pre-conferencing work with conference coordinators, continuing
over a period of weeks, to guarantee that all participants were prepared and
that safety of participants was ensured.92 The conference consisted of three
basic phases. First, the coordinator and other professionals outlined the ground
rules and the factual basis for referring the family to the Project in the first
place.93 Second, professional outlines provided background material on the
problems identified and social and therapeutic services available to address
them. Third, the family group was left alone to deliberate and develop a plan
to address the identified problems.94 Fourth, the professionals reviewed the
plan developed by the family to ensure that it addressed all issues of concern
and, further, that it included adequate monitoring provisions.95 Once
approved, the plan was then implemented. Plans typically included expected
components such as mental health and substance abuse services and material
assistance from government agencies, but often also included plans for
recreation and leisure events with family members.96 This latter component,
when it was included, may have helped in promoting family unity, which

86. See id. at 134.
87. Id. at 143-51; see also infra notes 98-109 and accompanying text (discussing the project
results).
88. Family Group Decision Making, supra note 82, at 138; Feminist Praxis, supra note 80,
at 110.
89. Feminist Praxis, supra note 80, at 110.
90. Id.
91. Family Group Decision Making, supra note 82, at 138. The three locales were Nain,
Port au Port Peninsula, and St. John’s. Id. See also infra notes 113-17 and accompanying text
(discussing the diversity of populations residing in these three locations).
92. Family Group Decision Making, supra note 82, at 139-40.
93. Id. at 140.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 141.
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Pennell and Burford identified as important to the reduction of family
violence.97
The results of the Canadian Project were encouraging and provide some
evidence of an intervention program that is effective in reducing family
violence. The results of the Project also provided welcome answers to some of
the concerns posed by feminists and victim advocates about the application of
restorative justice to family violence. First, the concern that batterers would
use the conference as an opportunity to further abuse their partners was not
borne out: in none of the conferences was any violence reported.98 This is
particularly striking given that the families were left alone to work on the
issues presented without the oversight of service providers or the conference
coordinator.99
Second, and more importantly, significant actual reductions in postconference partner and child abuse were demonstrated.100 These reductions in
family violence were in direct contrast with the comparison group, in which
increased incidents of violence during the study period were noted.101 The
families referred for FGC presented more incidents of violence (233 events)
prior to entering the Canadian Project than did the comparison families (129
events).102 By the conclusion of the Canadian Project, violent events within
the study families were not eliminated, but were cut almost in half (117
events);103 by contrast, violent events in the comparison group families rose
(165 events).104 This finding provides important evidence of the effectiveness
of restorative justice in reducing the prevalence of family violence.
Third, the study measured some of the controlling behaviors by batterers
that feminist advocates are concerned would not be accounted for, much less
reduced by restorative justice methods, and found marked reductions in all
behaviors studied.105 For instance, the study measured family functioning
including offender’s domination of conversation, resistance to her meeting
with program personnel without his being present, and control of economic
resources. In each of these categories, interviews with the participants in the
study group revealed significant improvement: during the average one-year
follow up period, domination of the conversation reduced from four to two
incidents pre- versus post-conferencing, and control of economic resources
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

Family Group Decision Making, supra note 82, 144-45.
Id. at 140.
Id. at 140.
Id. at 145-50.
Id. at 145-47.
Family Group Decision Making, supra note 82, at 145-47.
Id. at 145.
Id. at 147.
Id. at 146, 149-50.
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reduced from four to zero incidents.106 By contrast, the comparison group saw
little to no improvement, and, in some instances, evidenced a worsening:
control of discussion stayed constant at two incidents pre- and post-study,
whereas control of economic resources increased from three to four incidents
pre- versus post-study.107 Emotional abuse – unrecognized by traditional
criminal justice response – saw similar reductions in the study families and
increases in the comparison families. Men in the study families belittled their
partner (describing her as stupid, crazy, incompetent, and so on) in five
incidents pre-study versus three times post-study and were otherwise overly
solicitous and condescending to them in four incidents pre- versus two
incidents post-study.108 The comparison group numbers again demonstrate the
reverse trend: no incidents of belittling were indicated pre-study; whereas one
incident was noted post-study period, and rates of condescension stayed level
at three incidents throughout.109 The study also measured batterer’s
minimization of his violence, transference of responsibility for the violence to
the victim, and/or refusal to accept responsibility for it. As with the prior nonphysical abuse measures, study families saw a reduction from eight to three
incidents, pre- versus post-study, whereas the comparison group saw an
increase from four to six incidents.110 Finally, feminist concerns that
restorative justice would fail to account for, respond to, or change underlying
patriarchal belief systems proved unfounded. The Project tested for offenders’
“rigid” adherence to traditional sex roles, including “expecting or demanding
that [his partner] serve him.”111 While these beliefs reduced from three to one
in the study families pre- versus post-study, these sexist and gendered notions
of male/female relationships remained constant at five in the control group.112
All of these findings from the Canadian Project begin to give us some answers
to feminist concerns about using restorative justice in response to gendered
violence. Those answers uniformly point to the benefits of such an approach
and provide evidence that those concerns, while conceptually well-founded,
are empirically not supported.
B.

Applicability of Family Group Conferencing with Culturally and
Regionally Diverse Populations

106. Id. at 141-42, 146.
107. Family Group Decision Making, supra note 82, at 146.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. For a cogent presentation of the feminist concern that restorative justice would leave
a batterer’s belief system intact, see FREDERICK & LIZDAS, supra note 2, at 25-26.
112. Family Group Decision Making, supra note 82, at 146.
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In addition to the foregoing concerns about applying restorative justice to
gendered violence, at least one commentator has questioned whether
restorative justice methods, originally the province of indigenous peoples,
would ultimately prove feasible or effective in non-indigenous contexts.113
Pennell and Burford’s Canadian study provides at least a preliminary answer to
that question. In the Canadian Family Group Decision Making Project,
Pennell and Burford deployed the Project in three culturally and regionally
diverse locales in the Canadian province of Newfoundland & Labrador: an
Inuit community located on the coast of Labrador, a rural area consisting of a
mix of British, French, and Micmac populations, and an urban setting, the
capital of the province consisting primarily of residents of Irish and British
derivation.114 Upon completion of the Canadian Project, Pennell joined forces
with Marie Weil in developing a United States-based family group
conferencing program, the North Carolina Family Group Conferencing Project
(“NCFGCP”). The NCFGCP sought to mainstream the Canadian Projects’
approach but again included diverse groups within its purview.115 Early
analysis of the North Carolina program indicates that it yields similarly
positive outcomes.116 The diversity of populations included in the Canadian
and U.S. studies suggests that FGC can be used with good effect in various
cultural and regional milieus.117
VI. CONCLUSION
The foregoing discussion proposes that we listen to the voices of victims of
domestic violence and that we honor those voices in true feminist fashion, by
crafting responses to the violence they suffer that mirror the remedies victims
request. Further, the failure of three decades of legal reform to change
prevalence rates in any significant way suggests that we need to explore
alternative, even risky, approaches to the problem of intimate violence. The
preliminary evidence from restorative justice programs that address family
violence demonstrate that it may be more effective than all of the heavier
handed pro-incarceration efforts to which feminists in the United States have
been directing their efforts.
But what might we sacrifice if we focus on an individualized response
tailored to the needs of particular victims? We are faced with the question of
113. Coker, supra note 11, at 107-08.
114. Family Group Decision Making, supra note 82, at 138.
115. Initiating Conferencing, supra note 82, at 255-57; Feminist Praxis, supra note 80, at
115.
116. Feminist Praxis, supra note 80, at 115; Joan Pennell & Stephanie Francis, Safety
Conferencing: Toward a Coordinated and Inclusive Response to Safeguard Women and Children,
10 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN (forthcoming 2004) (on file with author).
117. Feminist Praxis, supra note 80, at 109.
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whether the infliction and/or resultant harm of intimate assault is merely the
expression and result of local rage of an individual towards a particular victim
for a set of relationship-specific reasons, or whether it is group-based with
some broader cause or effect. We risk reverting to a focus on the relationship
rather than the violence. We miss the impact of intimate violence on women
as a group, not just in terms of its disparate impact on women, but also how it
more subtly serves to perpetuate patriarchal notions of men’s dominance over
women.118 We risk losing the expressive function of law in combating
domestic violence and thereby potentially neglect the transformative power of
law to change social norms rather than individual behavior. Thus, any
restorative justice process must be sensitive to addressing the transformative
power of a justice process on changing social norms and must create a process
by which the sufferings of the individual are generalized to the treatment of
women as a group. In our own work on sexual assault, for example, we
decided to issue quarterly press releases in which the functioning of the
program, general types of cases received, and actions taken are communicated
to the citizenry. In addition, we aim to emphasize empowering the program’s
community oversight board, not just to respond to individuals, but to take a
lead in energizing the community’s social change agenda when they see certain
patterns of rape that are re-occurring such as alcohol related rape. We continue
to seek out new and better ways to expand the transformative potential of
RESTORE to alter prevailing social norms that undergird violence against
women.
118. See generally E. Gary Spitko, He Said, He Said: Same-Sex Sexual Harassment Under
Title VII and the “Reasonable Heterosexist” Standard, 18 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 56
(1997). The idea that battering one’s intimate partner is an act of sexism or a projection of
discriminatory animus toward the larger group might seem, at first glance, to be in conflict with
the traditional idea of intimate relationships, where there is a presumption of liking. See Hopkins,
Rescripting Relationships, supra note 2, at 465. In contrast to cases of racist violence, most
batterers and victims of intimate assault, would not say the assault was committed because of the
victim’s gender. Id. Putting aside whether batterers would acknowledge the gender motivation
for their violence, domestic violence victims would find extremely odd the idea that, “he beat her
because she was a woman.” Id. at 466. A punch is also gender (and race or sexual orientation)
neutral. Without the surrounding context, the violence cannot easily be seen as discriminatory
and can more easily be understood as the product of a single bad agent acting out violently for
localized, individual reasons. Id. The violence can be seen as a statement that the perpetrator is
more dominant than the victim, both physically and socially: “I beat you because I am bigger than
you (perhaps because I am male and you are female),” or “I beat you because I am allowed to
beat you because it is my privilege as a man to beat my woman.” Id. As discussed above, many
feminist advocates for victims put forward this combined sense of entitlement, rooted in
patriarchal ideas. Violence is clearly oppressive. Id. at 467. In combination with a theory of
entitlement that violence in an otherwise sexist world suggests, perhaps this may be sufficient for
one to infer that it is gender discrimination, and thus more appropriate for expressive and
symbolic civil justice rather than individualized response. Id.
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These are not small concerns, however, and not subject to an easy fix.
They also are not as subject to empirical test as is effectiveness in individual
cases, or even effectiveness in reducing overall prevalence rates. On the other
hand, to the extent that the harm at issue affects women as a group rather than
individually, intimate violence differs from stranger assault, which requires
that women be careful about where they walk, and when, and how, and with
whom. In this way, the sexual assault or rape of one woman serves to put all
women in fear of a similar assault.119 This same systemic or political concern
is not so clear in the case of intimate violence, but it is nonetheless present.
Because of that, we need to move slowly and cautiously in applying new
methods like restorative justice to intimate violence against women, despite its
great promise. We have to cautiously apply new methods and carefully
evaluate them so that we are aware of the impacts of our work both positive
and negative. The scholarly debate cannot move much further forward without
implementation and empirical evaluation to provide new evidence to move the
dialogue forward. Our research in the RESTORE program, where we are
using restorative justice for a narrow class of sexual crimes, employs just such
an incremental approach to developing empirical data to guide future
theorizing and practice.

119. MARGARET T. GORDON & STEPHANIE RIGER, THE FEMALE FEAR 2-3 (1988).
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